# @banteg: LayerZero attack was infra breach, not RPC poisoning Source: https://x.com/banteg/status/2046124661352644907?s=12 Kiwi News: https://news.kiwistand.com/stories/banteg-LayerZero-attack-was-infra-breach-not-RPC-poisoning?index=0x69e5d7fa6a6d85ef8181843fc5d7e96122c9198c66693ca0540c95d39fa3714d7233b9c4 Submitted by tim on 2026-04-20 UTC, 1 upvote, 0 comments ## Summary The author argues that the LayerZero attack was an infrastructure breach inside the trust boundary, not RPC poisoning. Per the post, attackers accessed the RPC list, compromised two nodes the DVN depended on, and swapped the op-geth binaries. The malicious binary reportedly hid its IP, served forged payloads only to the DVN while giving truthful responses to scans and other callers, and then self-destructed to wipe logs and binaries. ## Article layerzero attack was not rpc poisoning in networking poisoning is when the attacker outside the trust boundary taints a shared lookup (dns, arp, cache). the consumer has no reason to distrust the source. this was not that. the attackers got inside layerzero's trust boundary. they accessed the rpc list, compromised two nodes the dvn depended on, and swapped the op-geth binaries. that's an infra breach within the perimeter. supply-chain shaped, not network shaped. and the payload was surgical. the malicious binary cloaked by ip, served forged payload only to the dvn, told the truth to scan and every other caller, then self-destructed to wipe logs and binaries. rpc poisoning makes it sound like something that happened to the infra from the outside. the real story is a targeted implant operating inside the trust boundary. that's a meaningfully scarier attack than the label suggests.