@D2_Finance
@D2_Finance

@dcfgod is right! rsETH exploit forensics. Live on-chain. 1/ Attacker wallet: 0x1F4C1c2e610f089D6914c4448E6F21Cb0db3adeF @aave V3 supply ladder, one wallet: 1 → 400 → 5,000 → 20,000 → 27,999 rsETH. Textbook test-then-scale. Probe with 1 token, ramp each time the prior clears. 53,400 rsETH from this wallet. ~$134M. Cluster total: ~116,500 rsETH. ~$290M. 2/ Aave V3 ETH reserve, live: Supplied: 2.71M WETH ($6.37B) Borrowed: 2.71M WETH ($6.37B) Utilization: 100% Supply APY: 7.36% Borrow APY: 8.71% That is the bank run. WETH suppliers are locked. Withdrawals blocked, as first flagged by @Marczeller. 3/ The mechanic. Attacker drained rsETH (OFT bridge vector, per initial reports). Supplied it as collateral on Aave V3 mainnet. Borrowed max WETH up to liquidation threshold. Walked. Kelp paused redemptions. Secondary rsETH liquidity cracked. Aave oracle still marks near peg. Liquidators cannot close the position at mark. The gap becomes bad debt on the WETH reserve. 4/ Loss waterfall. a. Umbrella. First live stress test of the Q4 2025 replacement for Safety Module. Will it fully slash aWETH stakers to cover the deficit? b. Residual haircut flows pro-rata to remaining WETH suppliers. c. Kelp mainnet rsETH holders are intact. Native ETH backing untouched, circulating supply unchanged. This is not a Kelp mint exploit. It is a bridge theft that became an Aave bad debt via instant cash-out. 5/ The primitive lesson. Listing an LRT, or any bridged derivative, as collateral means underwriting the entire upstream dependency stack: - Bridge config and security (@LayerZero_Core OFT here) - Mint and burn permissions - Oracle feeds and redemption mechanics - Fee contracts and wrapper logic Any single point of failure upstream becomes WETH bad debt downstream. @StaniKulechov, this is a listing-authority problem more than a token problem. If the stack cannot be fully priced and simulated, do not list it.

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kelp-rseth-unichain-...
by timdaub.eth11999 🥝1dgithub.com
Ending the ACI Frontier programaave.com
Ending the ACI Frontier program
by mishaderidder.eth12136 🥝10h
@MonetSupply
@MonetSupply

because the final allocation of losses between rsETH on Ethereum (which is technically "fully backed") and external chains is still tbd, i can only read this as a statement of Aave Labs' preference - they would rather rsETH on mainnet to have zero haircut, and for rsETH on L2s/external chains to bear the full loss (essentially zeroed out) ultimately, the allocation of losses will be mostly decided by Kelpdao team (and lawyers) but we can consider why this outcome would be aave labs' preference, and what would be the impact on users if this is how it ends up working out # aave labs preference aave core market on ethereum is covered by umbrella insurance module, and is also explicitly covered by aave dao backstop (eg dao committed to using treasury to backstop against bad debt). so if rsETH on ethereum ends up with no haircut, then not only are umbrella users completely unaffected (other than potentially GHO stakers to cover unbacked GHO on external chains), but the aave treasury remains intact aave core is also the primary money-maker for the aave protocol, and preserving this is probably top priority for labs team # user impacts if rsETH on Ethereum has no socialized losses/haircut, users on Aave core would end up being mostly unimpacted however, certain L2 networks would face an extremely heavy burden, with WETH suppliers taking a direct hit from unbacked rsETH current rsETH collateral across external chains includes: - Base: $71 million - Arbitrum: $152 million - Mantle: $116 million - Ink: $21 million - Linea: $1.4 million in some cases, rsETH backed loop positions may comprise a large share of the backing of aWETH, meaning that any assets borrowed against ETH may also be at risk of a haircut (USDC and USDT0 markets) mantle, arbitrum, and base seem to have the highest risk here, with mantle in particular having the majority of aWETH backed by potentially zero value rsETH. it is possible that Aave could successfully maneuver these chains into bailing out their markets (this may be part of the reason why Aave Labs prefers no loss socialization on Ethereum, to force the issue with relatively better capitalized chain ecosystems) we also note that ethena has a material deposit amount in the mantle USDT pool (https://debank.com/profile/0xB8734a14fBD… which may face a haircut, potentially exceeding their excess capital buffer. if this is the case, then this would become another vector of contagion risk into Aave markets including Core and Plasma (which has been relatively less affected as it had no rsETH exposure at the time of the hack) # comparison with full socialization personally, i think that concentrating losses on external chains is actually a worse outcome for Aave in the case where losses are spread evenly including Ethereum users, this would engage Umbrella ETH depositors (roughly $50 million) and also enable using rsETH collateral on Aave Core to repay part of the debt, likely reducing the uncovered loss on Ethereum mainnet to an amount lower than Aave's current treasury reserves the loss levels on external chains would then be at much more manageable levels, with less risk of cascading spillover into large haircuts on stablecoin markets or impairment to other key aave collateral assets like USDe awaiting further updates from the Kelpdao team to see how this will play out in practice

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by mishaderidder.eth12136 🥝2hfirefly.social