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BEST · TUESDAY, 17 NOV

The best of the day.

The stories the Kiwi community upvoted most over the past day.

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@Lighter_xyz
@Lighter_xyz

We are actively investigating a security incident that appears to involve a single compromised external party. As a precaution, we have temporarily suspended all withdrawals and pool creation while we investigate the circumstances and assess the full impact.

01x.com

Lighter pauses withdrawals after leaked API keys drain about $15.5M

@Trezor
@Trezor

Data breach involving Skladon On 15 November, Skladon, one of our delivery partners, notified us that an attacker had gained unauthorized access to Trezor order data it holds. We’re still investigating with Skladon, but we want to let you know now. What we know: • We believe the data for about 27,000 orders placed between 9 August and 7 November was exported. • It includes name, phone number, address, email and order details. • Skladon delivers to many countries, so this isn’t limited to one region. • Trezor systems were not compromised, and your device is secure. Who is affected: • If you received our email today and ordered between 9 August and 7 November, your details were part of this incident. • A small number of customers who ordered between 9 and 14 August may also be affected, but we can’t email them: their details had already been anonymized in our systems. • Skladon does not ship to the US, so customers there are not affected. Treat any unexpected call, text, email or letter about your order as suspicious, and be alert to potential risks to your physical security. Trezor will never cold-call you or ask for your wallet backup. From today, anonymous pickup is live in 18 European countries, so you can order without giving us your home address. We’re also shortening our data retention period from 90 days to 45 (and plan to reduce it further), and we’re requiring our shipping partners to follow the same policy. We’re deeply sorry this has happened. Full details and FAQs: https://trezor.io/blog/news/data-breach-…

02securityx.com

@Trezor: Data breach at shipping partner Skladon exposes about 27,000 customer o

03securitygithub.io

Physical Bitcoin Attacks — Interactive Map

World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizelyreport-uri.com
04securityreport-uri.com

World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely

@0x0000G: I, too, was very inspired by @kimasendorfx.com
05x.com

@0x0000G: I, too, was very inspired by @kimasendorf

@DegenerateNews: Former UK PM Boris Johnson calls Satoshi Nakamotox.com
06x.com

@DegenerateNews: Former UK PM Boris Johnson calls Satoshi Nakamoto

@VitalikButerin
@VitalikButerin

My views on EIP-8037: https://docs.fileverse.io/document/dUHG8…

Tweet image
07x.com

@VitalikButerin: My views on EIP-8037

@VitalikButerin
@VitalikButerin

Over the past few weeks I've gone from thinking leanPCS is total bull to being a total bull. So let me explain some of these buzzwords in more detail. At the core, 8288 is about hyper-scaling data and execution for any computation that needs to get performed on a piece of data once, the chain learns the answer, and then we never need to see that data again. This sounds very specific, but it includes most "heavy" things happening on Ethereum: * Signatures * STARKs * Merkle branches * FHE computation * ... Really the first two are the most important. Once we go quantum-safe, signatures get bigger (65 bytes ECDSA -> 1-6 kB WOTS/SPHINCS depending on params) and ZKPs get much bigger (200-1000 bytes with groth16, PLONK, etc -> 128 kB with STARKs). This is unsustainable to put on chain, and 8288 fixes this. 8288 works by aggregating STARKs in the mempool. First, you as a user generate the STARK or SPHINCS signature or PCS opening (more on that last one later), and publish it. Then, each node listens. Each tick, each node takes all of the new objects that it has seen, and generates a STARK containing a list of "claims": "pubkey P has signed message M" "program X run on data D has output Y" "p(X) = Y for some polynomial P whose hash is H" and a proof that it has seen a signature, STARK or PCS opening verifying those claims. So the only information getting re-broadcasted is: (i) hashes of inputs and outputs (~64-96 bytes per claim) (ii) a single STARK proof per tick These aggregate proofs themselves get re-aggregated, and eventually you get to a single "master proof" in the block, that verifies that all of those statements are true. And so the only other data that has to actually go on chain is the statements (the (P, M), (X, D, Y), (X, Y, H) tuples I described above), not the actual signatures or proofs. This gets put into a specialized frame type. Now, let's get into the leanSPHINCS vs leanSTARK vs leanPCS part. The core distinction is: *what is the underlying object that the user is creating?* In leanSPHINCS, it's a signature, and specifically this particular type of purely-hash-based signature: https://ethresear.ch/t/sphincs-minus-eff… If we add leanSPHINCS, then users will be able to make quantum-safe accounts, and pay only a little bit of gas (4096 for the 64 bytes) for each signature. So we get scalable quantum-safety for regular accounts, multisigs, etc. But it's only one specific signature scheme, you can't do anything else. In leanSTARK, it's a STARK. This means it's fully general: the user runs whatever computation they want, and publish a STARK of it. So you can use it for: * Any signature scheme (including eg. lattice-based ones if you like those) * A multisig that hides its internal logic * Privacy protocols * Private account abstraction: authorization logic that depends on some value hidden elsewhere in the state, so you can have one key that controls all your accounts without publicly linking them to each other Basically, it's a free for all, in the same way the EVM is a free for all. But leanSTARK has a practical downside. The protocol would have to specify the language in which users write their programs (we call this the "ISA"). So we would have to agree on that language. This is a really big deal - it's the first big case of "Ethereum moving beyond the EVM" - and so it's likely to take time to agree on the details of it, especially since the ISA would be hard to upgrade. There are benefits to taking longer on this, figuring out the ideal ISA, and then even giving access to it inside regular contracts. LeanPCS is the third option. PCS stands for "polynomial commitment scheme": a proof that P(x) = y. The most important thing to know about PCSes is that they are by far the most important "hard" component of a STARK (see here: https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2021/01… ). If you have a "magic PCS oracle" (which from the EVM's point of view, 8288 is), you can verify a STARK in ~20-40k gas. The most important gain with PCS is that there is far less that we need to choose. Specifying a PCS only requires specifying a field, and there is a natural option: the 128 bit binary field (technically, we can go more general than that, and say the 2^k-bit binary recursive tower field, going up to 256) LeanPCS is less efficient than leanSTARK onchain, because you would have to put multiple claims to prove one thing. But it's arguably more efficient offchain, because you have much more flexibility to choose proof systems. But most importantly, leanPCS gives you the same generality as leanSTARK, in a way that could potentially be implemented very quickly. And once we figure out the ISA, we can add leanSTARK later. So there is a route to getting "the cryptographic proof singularity" much faster than any of us expected, and that route runs through 8288 with leanPCS. https://firefly.social/post/x/2120922104…

08x.com

Explaining EIP-8288, leanSPHINCS, leanSTARK, and leanPCS.

@breadcoop
@breadcoop

Security update In early November, stolen credentials were used to push malicious code into our GitHub repos. We caught and removed it within the week, scrubbed it from git history, and moved all keys and treasury signing access to hardware wallets. Our apps are safe to use.

09securityx.com

@breadcoop: Stolen credentials used to push malicious code to GitHub repos

Ethereum’s Guarantees Shouldn’t Stop at the Protocolx.com
10x.com

Ethereum’s Guarantees Shouldn’t Stop at the Protocol

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