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kazani@kazani

"Collaboration" is bullshit by @joanwestenberg.eth is getting popular on Hacker News. MUST READ 👇🏻 ➡️TLDR; S.L.A. Marshall's research in 'Men Against Fire' suggested that only 15-20% of riflemen in combat actively fired their weapons, indicating a widespread phenomenon of passive participation. This 80/20 ratio, where a minority performs the majority of the work, has been observed in various fields, including IBM's discovery about computer feature usage. The modern tech industry has embraced 'collaboration' as a solution to coordination and participation issues, leading to an obsession with teamwork. The proliferation of collaboration tools (Notion, Slack, Jira, etc.) has resulted in knowledge workers juggling numerous applications, often without significant output. Transparency and visibility have been confused with progress and accountability, leading to a focus on 'being included' rather than 'owning outcomes'. The diffusion of responsibility in groups, as observed by Maximilien Ringelmann with rope-pulling experiments, leads to reduced individual effort as group size increases. Frederick Brooks' observations in software development highlight how adding more people to a late project can actually make it later due to increased communication and coordination overhead. High-quality, complex work is often accomplished by individuals or small, accountable groups, with the narrative of teamwork applied retrospectively. The emphasis on collaboration as an ideology can make individual ownership and responsibility seem antisocial, hindering progress despite being the primary mechanism for completion. There is a need to shift back towards trusting individuals to perform their jobs, with clear individual accountability rather than diffused responsibility masked by extensive collaborative processes. https://farcaster.xyz/miniapps/2-GbJ1W4o…

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farcaster.xyz
by @kazani401 🥝3mofarcaster.xyz
shazow.eth@shazow.eth

❌ Social Network ❌ Social Media ✔️ Social Venue A social venue is about people. It is a place to make new friends, have abundant opportunities to deepen our friendships, and ultimately spend more time together in-person. A social venue can be a pub, a poker club, a chat group, a subreddit, or a feed of writing and images from people you follow. Social networks and social media have become terms burdened by their business models. They are about consumption and status. A chat group on Signal is not a social network or social media. An infinite feed of 60-second clips by random people is social media but it is not a social venue. In 2009, Twitter was an amazing social venue. I met many friends there, and enriched my existing friendships by having daily interactions I otherwise would not (even if it was just about sharing a pic of a sandwich). It hasn't felt the same for a long time--on the best days it is about consumption and on the worst days it is a battlefield. In 2024, Farcaster was a great social venue. I started going to local meetups hosted by @links, I competed in club @ted's poker games, I bought @samantha's incredible candles. I met many mutuals and some of them I still see in-person regularly! Making friends on Farcaster is a rare and extremely valuable thing to me, something that was a stark contrast with my friends who fled to Bluesky or Mastodon. I'd ask them "when was the last time you met people you follow irl?" and they'd look at me weird because that's what was conditioned out of us for the past decade. Online social venues is a big part of The Internet We Lost. Partly because of sheer scale of the internet (loss of cozy corners), and partly because our power structures have converged our norms into the present we live in. I want to talk less about social networks and social media, and more about social venues. How do we create healthy online social venues that can persist and thrive?

farcaster.xyz
by timdaub.eth12196 🥝5mofarcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

One thing that it is worth re-thinking is our perspective on when, and how, it makes sense to build "democratic things". This includes: * DAOs and voting mechanisms in DAOs * Quadratic and other funding gadgets * ZKpassport voting use cases, incl freedomtool type stuff, incl attempts to deploy it for local governance, etc * Voting systems inside social media * Attempts at "let's build and push for a brighter and freer political system for my country" Lately I am getting the feeling that there is less enthusiasm about these things than before. The "authoritarian wave" (a phenomenon that is often viewed as being about nation-state politics, but actually it stretches far beyond that, eg. see the phenomenon of companies lately becoming less "multi-stakeholder" and more founder-centric, and recent disillusionment with social media) is not just a matter of some malevolent strongmen smelling an opportunity to exert their will unopposed and seizing it. It's also a matter of genuine disillusionment with democratic things (of various types, not just nation-state, also corporate, nonprofit, social media). Defense of democratic things lately has the vibe of actually being conservatism: it's about fighting to preserve an existing order, and ward off hostile attempts to push the order toward a different order (or chaos) that favors a few people's interests at the expense of others, and not about appreciating positive benefits of the existing order. But conservatism is progressivism driving at the speed limit, and so if that's all that there is, it will inevitably lose, it will just take longer. There is an unfortunate irony to this, because it comes at the same time as we have much more powerful tools to build more effective democratic things: ZK, AI, much stronger cybersecurity, decades of research and experience. But to do so effectively we need to diagnose the present situation. I will break this down into a few parts. ## Stable era and chaotic era In the 00s and 10s, it was common to dream about things like: creating a global UBI, moving a country wholesale to a better political system like ranked-choice voting or quadratic voting, building a large-scale DAO that could eventually provide billions of dollars to global public goods that current systems miss (eg. open source software). Today, all of these dreams seem more unrealistic than ever. I see the main difference why as being that the 00s and 10s were a stable era, and the 20s are a chaotic era. In a stable era, more coordination is possible and imaginable, and so people naturally ask questions like "what would be a more perfect order?", and work towards it. In a chaotic era, the average intervention into the order is not a principled act of mechanism design, it's raw selfish power-grabbing, and so there is much less room to think about such questions. It's difficult to imagine eg. moving the United States to quadratic voting or ranked choice voting, when the country cannot even successfully ban gerrymandering. What do chaotic era democratic things look like? At a large scale, they do not look like hard binding mechanisms for making decisions. Rather, they look like tools for consensus-finding. They look like tools for identifying possible shifts to the order that would satisfy large cross-cutting groups of people, and presenting those possible shifts to change-making actors (yes, including centralized actors, even selfish actors), to make it clear to them that those particular shifts would be easier for them to accomplish, because they would have a lot of support and legitimacy. Pol.is style ideas are good here, anonymous voting is good, also perhaps assurance contract-style ideas: votes or statements that are anonymous at first, but that flip into being public (and hence publicly commit everyone at the same time) once they reach a certain threshold of support. This does not create a perfect order, but it gives highly distributed groups *a voice*. It gives actors with hard power something to listen to, and a credible claim that if they adjust their plans based on it, those plans are more likely to get widespread support and succeed. The Iran war is a good example here. My biggest fear in the ongoing situation has been that while the IRGC is unambiguously awful and murderous, there is an obvious divergence between US/Israel interests, and interests of Iranian common people: while both would be satisfied by a beautiful peaceful democratic Iran, the former would also be satisfied by the perhaps easier target of Iran becoming a low-threat low-capability wasteland, whereas for the latter that would be ruinous. How can Iranian people have a collective voice that carries hard power - not just in some future order that they create, but now, literally this week, while the situation is chaos? Some "sanctuary technology" is sanctuary money. Other times, it's sanctuary communication. But we need sanctuary tools for collective voice too.

farcaster.xyz
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝4mofarcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

Recently I have been starting to worry about the state of prediction markets, in their current form. They have achieved a certain level of success: market volume is high enough to make meaningful bets and have a full-time job as a trader, and they often prove useful as a supplement to other forms of news media. But also, they seem to be over-converging to an unhealthy product market fit: embracing short-term cryptocurrency price bets, sports betting, and other similar things that have dopamine value but not any kind of long-term fulfillment or societal information value. My guess is that teams feel motivated to capitulate to these things because they bring in large revenue during a bear market where people are desperate - an understandable motive, but one that leads to corposlop. I have been thinking about how we can help get prediction markets out of this rut. My current view is that we should try harder to push them into a totally different use case: hedging, in a very generalized sense (TLDR: we're gonna replace fiat currency) Prediction markets have two types of actors: (i) "smart traders" who provide information to the market, and earn money, and necessarily (ii) some kind of actor who loses money. But who would be willing to lose money and keep coming back? There are basically three answers to this question: 1. "Naive traders": people with dumb opinions who bet on totally wrong things 2. "Info buyers": people who set up money-losing automated market makers, to motivate people to trade on markets to help the info buyer learn information they do not know. 3. "Hedgers": people who are -EV in a linear sense, but who use the market as insurance, reducing their risk. (1) is where we are today. IMO there is nothing fundamentally morally wrong with taking money from people with dumb opinions. But there still is something fundamentally "cursed" about relying on this too much. It gives the platform the incentive to seek out traders with dumb opinions, and create a public brand and community that encourages dumb opinions to get more people to come in. This is the slide to corposlop. (2) has always been the idealistic hope of people like Robin Hanson. However, info buying has a public goods problem: you pay for the info, but everyone in the world gets it, including those who don't pay. There are limited cases where it makes sense for one org to pay (esp. decision markets), but even there, it seems likely that the market volumes achieved with that strategy will not be too high. This gets us to (3). Suppose that you have shares in a biotech company. It's public knowledge that the Purple Party is better for biotech than the Yellow Party. So if you buy a prediction market share betting that the Yellow Party will win the next election, on average, you are reducing your risk. Mathematical example: suppose that if Purple wins, the share price will be a dice roll between [80...120], and if Yellow wins, it's between [60...100]. If you make a size $5 bet that Yellow will win, your earnings become equivalent to a dice roll between [70...110] in both cases. Taking a logarithmic model of utility, this risk reduction is worth $0.58. Now, let's get to a more fascinating example. What do people who want stablecoins ultimately want? They want price stability. They have some future expenses in mind, and they want a guarantee that will be able to pay those expenses. But if crypto grows on top of USD-backed stablecoins, crypto is ultimately not truly decentralized. Furthermore, different people have different types of expenses. There has been lots of thinking about making an "ideal stablecoin" that is based on some decentralized global price index, but what if the real solution is to go a step further, and get rid of the concept of currency altogether? Here's the idea. You have price indices on all major categories of goods and services that people buy (treating physical goods/services in different regions as different categories), and prediction markets on each category. Each user (individual or business) has a local LLM that understands that user's expenses, and offers the user a personalized basket of prediction market shares, representing "N days of that user's expected future expenses". Now, we do not need fiat currency at all! People can hold stocks, ETH, or whatever else to grow wealth, and personalized prediction market shares when they want stability. Both of these examples require prediction markets denominated in an asset people want to hold, whether interest-bearing fiat, wrapped stocks, or ETH. Non-interest-bearing fiat has too-high opportunity cost, that overwhelms the hedging value. But if we can make it work, it's much more sustainable than the status quo, because both sides of the equation are likely to be long-term happy with the product that they are buying, and very large volumes of sophisticated capital will be willing to participate. Build the next generation of finance, not corposlop.

farcaster.xyz
by rvolz.eth1410 🥝4mofarcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

Have been following reactions to what I said about L2s about 1.5 days ago. One important thing that I believe is: "make yet another EVM chain and add an optimistic bridge to Ethereum with a 1 week delay" is to infra what forking Compound is to governance - something we've done far too much for far too long, because we got comfortable, and which has sapped our imagination and put us in a dead end. If you make an EVM chain *without* an optimistic bridge to Ethereum (aka an alt L1), that's even worse. We don't friggin need more copypasta EVM chains, and we definitely don't need even more L1s. L1 is scaling and is going to bring lots of EVM blockspace - not infinite (AIs in particular will need both more blockspace and lower latency than even a greatly scaled L1 can offer), but lots. Build something that brings something new to the table. I gave a few examples: privacy, app-specific efficiency, ultra-low latency, but my list is surely very incomplete. A second important thing that I believe is: regarding "connection to Ethereum", vibes need to match substance. I personally am a fan of many of the things that can be called "app chains". For example I think there's a large chance that the optimal architecture for prediction markets is something like: the market gets issued and resolved on L1, user accounts are on L1, but trading happens on some based rollup or other L2-like system, where the execution reads the L1 to verify signatures and markets. I like architectures where deep connection to L1 is first-class, and not an afterthought ("we're pretty much a separate chain, but oh yeah, we have a bridge, and ok fine let's put 1-2 devs to get it to stage 1 so the l2beat people will put a green checkmark on it so vitalik likes us"). The other extreme of "app chain", eg. the version where you convince some government registry, or social media platform, or gaming thing, to start putting merkle roots of its database, with STARKs that prove every update was authorized and signed and executed according to a pre-committed algorithm, onchain, is also reasonable - this is what makes the most sense to me in terms of "institutional L2s". It's obviously not Ethereum, not credibly neutral and not trustless - the operator can always just choose to say "we're switching to a different version with different rules now". But it would enable verifiable algorithmic transparency, a property that many of us would love to see in government, social media algorithms or wherever else, and it may enable economic activity that would otherwise not be possible. I think if you're the first thing, it's valid and great to call yourself an Ethereum application - it can't survive without Ethereum even technologically, it maximizes interoperability and composability with other Ethereum applications. If you're the second thing, then you're not Ethereum, but you are (i) bringing humanity more algorithmic transparency and trust minimization, so you're pursuing a similar vision, and (ii) depending on details probably synergistic with Ethereum. So you should just say those things directly! Basically: 1. Do something that brings something actually new to the table. 2. Vibes should match substance - the degree of connection to Ethereum in your public image should reflect the degree of connection to Ethereum that your thing has in reality.

farcaster.xyz
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝5mofarcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

One metaphor for Ethereum is BitTorrent, and how that p2p network combines decentralization and mass scale. Ethereum's goal is to do the same thing but with consensus. Another metaphor for Ethereum is Linux. * Linux is free and open source software, and does not compromise on this * Linux is quietly depended on by billions of people and enterprises worldwide. Governments regularly use it. * There are many operating systems based on Linux that pursue mass adoption * There are Linux distributions (eg. Arch) that are highly purist, minimalistic and technologically beautiful, and focus on making the user feel powerful, not comfortable (Actually, BitTorrent is depended on by enterprises too: many businesses and even governments (!!) use it to distribute large files to their users https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/8-legal-us… ) We must make sure that Ethereum L1 works as the financial (and ultimately identity, social, governance...) home for individuals and organizations who want the higher level of autonomy, and give them access to the full power of the network without dependence on intermediaries. At the same time, what Linux shows is that this is fully compatible with providing value to very large numbers of people, and even being loved and trusted by enterprises worldwide. Many enterprises in fact desperately want to build on an open and resilient ecosystem - what we call trustlessness, they call prudent counterparty risk minimization. This is the gwei.

farcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

Now that ZKEVMs are at alpha stage (production-quality performance, remaining work is safety) and PeerDAS is live on mainnet, it's time to talk more about what this combination means for Ethereum. These are not minor improvements; they are shifting Ethereum into being a fundamentally new and more powerful kind of decentralized network. To see why, let's look at the two major types of p2p network so far: BitTorrent (2000): huge total bandwidth, highly decentralized, no consensus Bitcoin (2009): highly decentralized, consensus, but low bandwidth - because it’s not “distributed” in the sense of work being split up, it’s *replicated* Now, Ethereum with PeerDAS (2025) and ZK-EVMs (expect small portions of the network using it in 2026), we get: decentralized, consensus and high bandwidth The trilemma has been solved - not on paper, but with live running code, of which one half (data availability sampling) is *on mainnet today*, and the other half (ZK-EVMs) is *production-quality on performance today* - safety is what remains. This was a 10-year journey (see the first commit of my original post on DAS here: https://github.com/ethereum/research/wik… , and ZK-EVM attempts started in ~2020), but it's finally here. Over the next ~4 years, expect to see the full extent of this vision roll out: * In 2026, large non-ZKEVM-dependent gas limit increases due to BALs and ePBS, and we'll see the first opportunities to run a ZKEVM node * In 2026-28, gas repricings, changes to state structure, exec payload going into blobs, and other adjustments to make higher gas limits safe * In 2027-30, large further gas limit increases, as ZKEVM becomes the primary way to validate blocks on the network A third piece of this is distributed block building. A long-term ideal holy grail is to get to a future where the full block is *never* constituted in one single place. This will not be necessary for a long time, but IMO it is worth striving for us at least have the capability to do that. Even before that point, we want the meaningful authority in block building to be as distributed as possible. This can be done either in-protocol (eg. maybe we figure out how to expand FOCIL to make it a primary channel for txs), or out-of-protocol with distributed builder marketplaces. This reduces risk of centralized interference with real-time transaction inclusion, AND it creates a better environment for geographical fairness. Onward.

farcaster.xyz
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝6mofarcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

We need better decentralized stablecoins. IMO three problems: 1. Ideally figure out an index to track that's better than USD price 2. Oracle design that's decentralized and is not capturable with a large pool of money 3. Solve the problem that staking yield is competition Tracking USD is fine short term, but imo part of the vision of nation state resilience should be independence even from that price ticker. On a 20 year timeline, well, what if it hyperinflates, even moderately? If you don't have (2), then you have to ensure cost of capture > protocol token market cap, which in turn implies protocol value extraction > discount rate, which is quite bad for users. This is a big part of why I constantly rail against financialized governance btw: it inherently has no defense/offense asymmetry, and so high levels of extraction are the only way to be stable. And, of course, it's a big part of why I refuse to give up on DAOs entirely. If you don't have (3), then again you have a few percent APY suboptimal return rates, which is quite bad. The possible paths to solving (3) [treat this as enumeration of the solution space, not endorsement] are basically: (i) reduce staking yield to like 0.2%, basically hobbyist level (ii) create a new category of staking which has yield almost as high as regular staking, but which does not have the same slashing risk (iii) figure out how to make slashable staking compatible with usability as collateral (does it mean that slashing risk somehow passes on to stablecoin and CDP holders, so both of those need to stake and trust the same delegate?) If you're going to try to reason through this in detail, remember that the "slashing risk" to guard against is *both* self-contradiction, *and* being on the wrong side of an inactivity leak, ie. engaging in a 51% censorship attack. In general, we think too much about the former and not enough about the latter. Also remember that a stablecoin cannot be secured with a fixed amount of ETH collateral; in the event of large drops you need to be able to handle rebalancing (though of course you could choose to partially drop this goal in a clever way, eg. if ETH price moves too much you stop earning staking yield until you take some other action) https://x.com/lex_node/status/2009956304…

farcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

An important, and perenially underrated, aspect of "trustlessness", "passing the walkaway test" and "self-sovereignty" is protocol simplicity. Even if a protocol is super decentralized with hundreds of thousands of nodes, and it has 49% byzantine fault tolerance, and nodes fully verify everything with quantum-safe peerdas and starks, if the protocol is an unwieldy mess of hundreds of thousands of lines of code and five forms of PhD-level cryptography, ultimately that protocol fails all three tests: * It's not trustless because you have to trust a small class of high priests who tell you what properties the protocol has * It doesn't pass the walkaway test because if existing client teams go away, it's extremely hard for new teams to get up to the same level of quality * It's not self-sovereign because if even the most technical people can't inspect and understand the thing, it's not fully yours It's also less secure, because each part of the protocol, especially if it can interact with other parts in complicated ways, carries a risk of the protocol breaking. One of my fears with Ethereum protocol development is that we can be too eager to add new features to meet highly specific needs, even if those features bloat the protocol or add entire new types of interacting components or complicated cryptography as critical dependencies. This can be nice for short-term functionality gains, but it is highly destructive to preserving long-term self-sovereignty, and creating a hundred-year decentralized hyperstructure that transcends the rise and fall of empires and ideologies. The core problem is that if protocol changes are judged from the perspective of "how big are they as changes to the existing protocol", then the desire to preserve backwards compatibility means that additions happen much more often than subtractions, and the protocol inevitably bloats over time. To counteract this, the Ethereum development process needs an explicit "simplification" / "garbage collection" function. "Simplification" has three metrics: * Minimizing total lines of code in the protocol. An ideal protocol fits onto a single page - or at least a few pages * Avoiding unnecessary dependencies on fundamentally complex technical components. For example, a protocol whose security solely depends on hashes (even better: on exactly one hash function) is better than one that depends on hashes and lattices. Throwing in isogenies is worst of all, because (sorry to the truly brilliant hardworking nerds who figured that stuff out) nobody understands isogenies. * Adding more _invariants_: core properties that the protocol can rely on, for example EIP-6780 (selfdestruct removal) added the property that at most N storage slots can be changedakem per slot, significantly simplifying client development, and EIP-7825 (per-tx gas cap) added a maximum on the cost of processing one transaction, which greatly helps ZK-EVMs and parallel execution. Garbage collection can be piecemeal, or it can be large-scale. The piecemeal approach tries to take existing features, and streamline them so that they are simpler and make more sense. One example is the gas cost reforms in Glamsterdam, which make many gas costs that were previously arbitrary, instead depend on a small number of parameters that are clearly tied to resource consumption. One large-scale garbage collection was replacing PoW with PoS. Another is likely to happen as part of Lean consensus, opening the room to fix a large number of mistakes at the same time ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=10Ym34y3… ). Another approach is "Rosetta-style backwards compatibility", where features that are complex but little-used remain usable but are "demoted" from being part of the mandatory protocol and instead become smart contract code, so new client developers do not need to bother with them. Examples: * After we upgrade to full native account abstraction, all old tx types can be retired, and EOAs can be converted into smart contract wallets whose code can process all of those transaction types * We can replace existing precompiles (except those that are _really_ needed) with EVM or later RISC-V code * We can eventually change the VM from EVM to RISC-V (or other simpler VM); EVM could be turned into a smart contract in the new VM. Finally, we want to move away from client developers feeling the need to handle all older versions of the Ethereum protocol. That can be left to older client versions running in docker containers. In the long term, I hope that the rate of change to Ethereum can be slower. I think for various reasons that ultimately that _must_ happen. These first fifteen years should in part be viewed as an adolescence stage where we explored a lot of ideas and saw what works and what is useful and what is not. We should strive to avoid the parts that are not useful being a permanent drag on the Ethereum protocol. Basically, we want to improve Ethereum in a way that looks like this:

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farcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

My first reaction to this was: "And that's why I just got my $2,725 check of fileverse tokens now that fileverse has grown to the point where my dad regularly writes docs in fileverse that he sends to me" My second reaction to this was: "I see how this makes total sense from a crypto perspective, but it makes zero sense from an outside-of-crypto perspective ... hmm, what does this say about crypto?" My more detailed reaction: There are many distinct activities that you can refer to as "incentivizing users". First of all, paying some of your users with coins that your app gets by charging other users is totally fine: that's just a sustainable economic loop, there is nothing wrong with this. The activity that I think people are thinking about more is, paying all your users while the app is early, with the hope of "building network effect" and then making that money back (and much more) later when the app is mature. My general view, if you _really_ have to simplify it and sacrifice some nuances for the sake of brevity, is: * Incentives that compensate for unavoidable temporary costs that come from your thing being immature are good * Incentives that bring in totally new classes of users that would not use even a mature version of your thing without those incentives are bad For example, I have no problem with many types of defi liquidity rewards, because to me they compensate for per-year risk of the project being hacked or the team turning out to be scammers, a risk that is inherently higher for new projects and much lower once a project becomes more mature. Paying people to make tweets that get attention, might be the most "pure" example of the wrong thing to do, because you are going to get people who come to your platform to make tweets, with every incentive to game any mechanisms you have to judge quality and optimize for maximum laziness on their part, and then immediately disappear as soon as the incentives go away. In principle, content incentivization is a valuable and important problem, but it should be done with care, with an eye to quality over quantity, which are not natural goals that designers of "bootstrapping incentives" have by default. If fact, even if users do not disappear after incentives go away, there is a further problem: you succeed from the perspective of growing *quantity of community*, but you fail from the perspective of growing *quality of community*. In the case of defi protocols, you can argue: 1 ETH in an LP pool is 1 ETH doing useful work, regardless of whether it's put there by a cypherpunk or an amoral money maximizer. But, (i) this argument can only be made for defi, not for other areas like social, where esp. in the 2020s, quality matters more than quantity, and (ii) there are always subtle ways in which higher-quality community members help your protocol more in the long term (eg. by writing open-source tools, answering people's questions in online or offline forums, being potential developers on your team). The ideal incentive is an incentive that exactly compensates for temporary downsides of your protocol, those downsides that will disappear once the protocol has more maturity, and attracts zero users who would not be there organically once the protocol is mature. Charging users fees, but paying them back in protocol tokens, I think is also reasonable: it's effectively turning your users into your investors by default, which seems like a good thing to do. A further more cynical take I have is that in the 2021-24 era, the "real product" was creating a speculative bubble, and so the real function of many incentives was to pump up narratives to justify the narrative for the bubble. So any argument that incentives are good for bootstrapping acquisition should be not judged on the question of whether it's plausible, but on the question of whether it's more plausible than the alternative claim that it's all galaxy brain justification ( https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2025/11… ) for a "pump and dump wearing a suit". TLDR: the bulk of the effort should be on making an actually-useful app. This was historically ignored, because it's not necessary for narrative engineering to create a speculative bubble. But now it is necessary. And we do see that the successful apps now, the apps that we actually most appreciate and respect, do the bulk of their user acquisition work in that way, not by paying users to come in indiscriminately. https://firefly.social/post/x/2021632354…

farcaster.xyz
vitalik.eth@vitalik.eth

I actually don't think it's complicated. IMO the future of onchain mechanism design is mostly going to fit into one pattern: [something that looks like a prediction market] -> [something that looks like a capture-resistant, non-financialized preference-setting gadget] In other words: * One layer that is maximally open and maximizes accountability (it's a market, anyone can buy and sell, if you make good decisions you win money if you make bad decisions you lose money) * One layer that is decentralized and pluralistic, and that maximizes space for intrinsic motivation. This cannot be token-based, because token owners are not pluralistic, and anyone can buy in and get 51% of them. Votes here should be anonymous, ideally MACI'd to reduce risk of collusion. The prediction market is the correct way to do a "decentralized executive", because the most logical primitive for "accountability" in a permissionless concept is exactly that. Though sometimes you will want to keep it simple, and do a centralized executive at that layer instead: [replaceable centralized executive] -> [something that looks like a capture-resistant, non-financialized preference-setting gadget] Thinking in these two layers explicitly: (i) what is doing your execution, (ii) what is doing your preference-setting and is judging the executor(s), is best. https://firefly.social/post/x/2018205196…

farcaster.xyz
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝5mofarcaster.xyz
@ALCrego_
@ALCrego_

Cryptoart made people believe that anybody could be ‘the next Picasso, Dali or Banksy’ just because random guys with a lot of money bought random things by random big amounts, and of course not based on artistic value, but as a blind attempt of ‘creating artists’ to later, benefit from them… But sorry, nobody here is the next Picasso, Dali or Banksy, and we all can see and confirm, day by day, that these random guys with a lot of money have left, these supposed ‘grails’ got rusted in a couple of years, platforms who promised ‘the next step of art’ have vanished and all these illusory and fake narratives (never created by artists, but by self proclaimed curators, part of companies), are slowly losing sense. Go out of this echo chamber, of this jail, talk with people and realize almost nobody know what we do here, who we are and where things are going nor where they come from. Nobody wants to be part of a ‘culture’ where everything is centralized, tied and orchestrated around the same actors over and over again, because people dont see a chance, not even to develop and grow, but also in many cases, to even start. In a jail, as in a sect,you can move, yes, but only inside the limits drawn by those who dictate the ‘rules’. What was supposed to be a movement to empower and to allow independent artists do their job, has turned into a machine that is using them to kill them. The walls of Cryptoart must fall.

x.com
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝4dfirefly.social
@drakefjustin
@drakefjustin

Introducing strawmap, a strawman roadmap by EF Protocol. Believe in something. Believe in an Ethereum strawmap. Who is this for? The document, available at strawmap[.]org, is intended for advanced readers. It is a dense and technical resource primarily for researchers, developers, and participants in Ethereum governance. Visit ethereum[.]org/roadmap for more introductory material. Accessible explainers unpacking the strawmap will follow soon™. What is the strawmap? The strawmap is an invitation to view L1 protocol upgrades through a holistic lens. By placing proposals on a single visual it provides a unified perspective on Ethereum L1 ambitions. The time horizon spans years, extending beyond the immediate focus of All Core Devs (ACD) and forkcast[.]org which typically cover only the next couple of forks. What are some of the highlights? The strawmap features five simple north stars, presented as black boxes on the right: → fast L1: fast UX, via short slots and finality in seconds → gigagas L1: 1 gigagas/sec (10K TPS), via zkEVMs and real-time proving → teragas L2: 1 gigabyte/sec (10M TPS), via data availability sampling → post quantum L1: durable cryptography, via hash-based schemes → private L1: first-class privacy, via shielded ETH transfers What is the origin story? The strawman roadmap originated as a discussion starter at an EF workshop in Jan 2026, partly motivated by a desire to integrate lean Ethereum with shorter-term initiatives. Upgrade dependencies and fork constraints became particularly effective at surfacing valuable discussion topics. The strawman is now shared publicly in a spirit of proactive transparency and accelerationism. Why the "strawmap" name? "Strawmap" is a portmanteau of "strawman" and "roadmap". The strawman qualifier is deliberate for two reasons: 1. It acknowledges the limits of drafting a roadmap in a highly decentralized ecosystem. An "official" roadmap reflecting all Ethereum stakeholders is effectively impossible. Rough consensus is fundamentally an emergent, continuous, and inherent uncertain process. 2. It underscores the document's status as a work-in-progress. Although it originated within the EF Protocol cluster, there are competing views held among its 100 members, not to mention a rich diversity of non-EFer views. The strawmap is not a prediction. It is an accelerationist coordination tool, sketching one reasonably coherent path among millions of possible outcomes. What is the strawmap time frame? The strawmap focuses on forks extending through the end of the decade. It outlines seven forks by 2029 based on a rough cadence of one fork every six months. While grounded in current expectations, these timelines should be treated with healthy skepticism. The current draft assumes human-first development. AI-driven development and formal verification could significantly compress schedules. What do the letters on top represent? The strawmap is organized as a timeline, with forks progressing from left to right. Consensus layer forks follow a star-based naming scheme with incrementing first letters: Altair, Bellatrix, Capella, Deneb, Electra, Fulu, etc. Upcoming forks such as Glamsterdam and Hegotá have finalized names. Other forks, like I* and J*, have placeholder names (with I* pronounced "I star"). What do the colors and arrows represent? Upgrades are grouped into three color-coded horizontal layers: consensus (CL), data (DL), execution (EL). Dark boxes denote headliners (see below), grey boxes indicate offchain upgrades, and black boxes represent north stars. An explanatory legend appears at the bottom. Within each layer, upgrades are further organized by theme and sub-theme. Arrows signal hard technical dependencies or natural upgrade progressions. Underlined text in boxes links to relevant EIPs and write-ups. What are headliners? Headliners are particularly prominent and ambitious upgrades. To maintain a fast fork cadence, the modern ACD process limits itself to one consensus and one execution headliner per fork. For example, in Glamsterdam, these headliners are ePBS and BALs, respectively. (L* is an exceptional fork, displaying two headliners tied to the bigger lean consensus fork. Lean consensus landing in L* would be a fateful coincidence.) Will the strawmap evolve? Yes, the strawmap is a living and malleable document. It will evolve alongside community feedback, R&D advancements, and governance. Expect at least quarterly updates, with the latest revision date noted on the document. Can I share feedback? Yes, feedback is actively encouraged. The EF Protocol strawmap is maintained by the EF Architecture team: @adietrichs, @barnabemonnot, @fradamt, @drakefjustin. Each has open DMs and can be reached at first.name@ethereum[.]org. General inquiries can be sent to strawmap@ethereum[.]org.

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by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝4mofirefly.social
@dappcon: Speaker applications are OPEN
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝4mofirefly.social
@auryn_macmillan
@auryn_macmillan

## AI voting proxies require two layers: private inference and private aggregation. AI voting proxies require two layers: private inference and private aggregation. Vitalik recently wrote about AI "shadows" — LLM proxies trained on your own corpus that vote on your behalf with near-100% participation. He's right that cryptography is the key enabler. But I want to make that concrete by separating it into these two layers. But first, a diagnosis from personal experience. * * * ## The DAO governance trap I'm a DAO advocate. I've spent more than a decade building and participating in them. But I've also watched the same failure mode play out repeatedly — and it stems not from the DAO model itself, but from a specific dogma within it: the wholesale rejection of hierarchy. DAOs are structurally resistant to hierarchy. The ethos is flat, everyone votes on everything. In theory this is beautiful. In practice it's paralyzing. What actually happens: DAOs end up voting only on large budget items and protocol upgrades, while deferring entirely to labs and core teams for day-to-day decisions. The org atrophies into a rubber stamp with a treasury. The deeper irony is that rejecting hierarchy doesn't eliminate it. It just makes it informal and unaccountable. Power concentrates anyway, without the transparency that explicit structure provides. "Everyone votes on everything" isn't a bad governance philosophy. It was always a hardware problem. Human bandwidth is finite. Attention is scarce. Flat structures collapsed back into de facto hierarchies because they had no other choice. AI shadows change this calculus. * * * ## Continuous governance If your vote is cast by a proxy that is trained or tuned on your values, your priorities, and your evolving perspective, and casting it costs you nothing, then the participation constraint is radically changed. Votes don't need to be reserved for high-stakes moments. They can be granular, frequent, and fast. Imagine a DAO where operational decisions resolve in minutes, not weeks. Where the organisation's direction is a continuous live aggregate of its members' preferences, not a series of discrete referendums that most people ignore. Where "everyone votes on everything" is not an aspirational gesture but a literal description of how the org runs day to day. This connects to something Karl Popper and David Deutsch identified as the core measure of good governance: not who holds power, but how easily bad policy can be corrected and bad leadership removed. Good governance is a process of conjecture and the elimination of error. The question is not "did we get the right answer?" but "can we fix it quickly when we get the wrong one?" Frequent, fine-grained, direct participation is the most natural expression of this principle. The faster errors surface and the lower the cost of correcting them, the healthier the system. A governance layer where votes resolve in minutes, on granular day-to-day decisions, is structurally more Popperian than one where correction requires waiting four years for an election or months for a DAO proposal to pass quorum. This is the Open Society, operationalised. * * * ## The cryptographic stack that makes it private For this to work at scale, and especially on sensitive decisions, inference and aggregation have to be private. Here's what that architecture looks like. ### Phase 1: Private inference Your AI shadow needs to run somewhere. You probably don't have the hardware to run a frontier model locally. Several options exist, each with a different trust model: * **"Trust-me-bro" remote models.** You send your data to a provider and trust them not to look. Simple, fast, available today. The weakest privacy guarantee. * **Local models.** You run the model yourself. Personal privacy, no third-party trust required. Constrained by your hardware and the quality of models that fit on it. * **TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments).** The provider runs the model inside a hardware enclave. You trust the chip manufacturer rather than the provider. Stronger than pure trust, weaker than cryptographic guarantees. * **MPC (Multi-Party Computation).** Inference is split across multiple parties who collectively compute the result without any single party seeing the full picture. Strong guarantees, significant coordination overhead. * **FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryption).** Your data stays encrypted throughout inference. The provider computes over ciphertext and returns a result only you can read. The strongest cryptographic guarantee, and the most computationally expensive. These approaches will compete. The right choice depends on the user's trust model, hardware constraints, and tolerance for latency and cost. That choice belongs entirely to the user and has no bearing on the aggregation layer. The decrypt moment is where periodic human review naturally lives. You're not approving every vote — that would defeat the purpose. Rather, you're occasionally checking in with your shadow, discussing how your priorities, perspectives, and values have evolved, correcting it where its actions have diverged from your preferences, and letting those corrections inform its future behaviour. It's less a checkpoint and more a feedback loop. The proxy itself improves through error correction over time. ### Phase 2: Private aggregation Your proxy encrypts your vote and contributes it to a collective computation. This is where something like [The Interfold](https://theinterfold.com) comes in. The Interfold performs the computation over encrypted inputs and produces publicly verifiable outputs. All inputs are encrypted. The only valid output proof requires consuming every encrypted input and running the expected computation. A bonded threshold committee of node operators coordinates to decrypt the final output. The result: mathematically guaranteed correct aggregate output. No party — not the inference provider, not other voters, not the aggregation layer — ever sees individual inputs. The two phases are cryptographically decoupled. The handoff is simple: decrypt locally, re-encrypt under the aggregation scheme. The plaintext moment is brief and intentional. You are the trusted party in possession of your own data. User ↓ AI shadow inference ↓ human audit loop ↓ encrypted preference signal ↓ collective computation ↓ public result * * * ## Why this matters for Vitalik's chaotic era Vitalik argues that in a chaotic era, democratic tools shouldn't try to bind decisions. They should find consensus and give distributed groups a voice that hard-power actors can listen to. AI shadows with private aggregation serve this goal. But they go further. They don't just make participation possible at scale. They make granular, continuous participation possible. The bandwidth constraint that has always forced democratic systems toward blunt, infrequent, high-stakes votes is lifted. * * * ## Parallel societies It would be naive to expect existing institutions to adopt any of this soon. Nation-states, corporations, and legacy DAOs all have strong incentives to preserve existing power structures. Waiting for them to change is not a strategy. But there is no reason to wait. These tools can be deployed in parallel, now, within communities that choose to use them. The history of institutional change is largely a history of parallel structures that proved their worth and were eventually copied or absorbed. The goal is not to replace existing institutions overnight. It is to demonstrate, at small scale, that a more participatory and error-correcting form of governance is not only possible but practical. At @web3privacy's CC2 and @EFDevcon last year, @ArnaudS proposed his personal litmus test for Ethereum, and both @jarradhope_ and @satorinakamoto spoke about the promise of parallel societies. These two ideas have stayed with me. My litmus test for Ethereum is this: its real-world capacity to bring about the flourishing of parallel societies, ultimately in pursuit of the Open Society. Private, direct, participatory democratic systems seem like a significant step in that direction. The cryptographic foundation exists today. The question is whether we build and use it. http://theinterfold.com | http://docs.theinterfold.com

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by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝3mofirefly.social
@dfinzer
@dfinzer

an update on $SEA. the team has been building at full speed, and the foundation had planned to kick off the first steps as part of our march 30th event. but @openseafdn is pushing back the timeline. a delay is a delay. i’m not going to dress it up, and i know how it lands. the reality is that market conditions are challenging across crypto right now, and $SEA only launches once. @openseafdn could force the original date, or we could ensure every piece is in place and make this moment what this community deserves. we gave a tremendous amount of thought to how to do right here. I’m thankful to @HollanderAdam for bringing the community’s voice into every conversation. we’ll be doing the following: no more waves: the current rewards wave will be our last. optional fee refund: recognizing that we originally committed to a Q1 date, we’re offering refunds of the platform fees we retained while participating in the rewards waves (3 - 6) that followed our timing announcement. if you like, you can receive a refund of those fees, which when combined with treasure chest prizes, essentially means all of your trading during that period was on us. if you opt for a refund, the Treasures you were awarded during these waves will be removed from your account. details on this process will follow. honoring existing Treasures: for Treasures you continue to hold, our prior commitment stands: they will be meaningfully considered by the Foundation at TGE. this is independent from allocations for historical activity. 0% fees for 60 days: starting on march 31st, opensea will reduce our own token trading fees to 0%. we want to make it a no-brainer for everyone to experience our new platform: cross-chain token trading, mobile app, perps and more. after this 60 day period, we will put a new system in place that makes fees significantly more competitive for anyone trading consistently on opensea. product updates: while we’re postponing our march 30th event, we’ll host a separate one in the coming months focused on product updates. it’s been incredible to see the early responses to our mobile app, and we can’t wait to get it into more people’s hands. so if not now, wen? when we announced last year, it was too early. that created unnecessary uncertainty and reactivity. so when the Foundation sets a new timeline, it will be deliberate and specific. here’s why i’m confident that’s the right move: i’ve been building opensea for almost a decade. when this started, we were two people and the only thing you could trade on OS was cryptokitties. i’ve watched this space go from a niche curiosity to billions in volume to where we are today. the thing that’s carried us through every cycle was a willingness to make hard calls when it mattered. when our market crashed, we rebuilt from zero: an entirely new stack, a new product, and a new team culture. that hurt in the short term. but today OS2 is undeniably the strongest marketplace offering, and it’s the foundation everything sits on. we have huge ambitions as a company, and we’re here for the long game. making all of non-custodial crypto delightful on mobile is just the beginning. that means we have to set a very high bar for everything we do, and it’s why i’m so protective of delivering a launch that’s worthy of this community and everything we’re putting into this.

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by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝3mofirefly.social
@leventnacakci
@leventnacakci

Refik Anadol’s work frequently employs terms like “fluid dynamics,” “latent space,” and “algorithmic brushstrokes,” which give the viewer a false sense of intellectual depth. But the reality is this: these terms often serve to mask the artist’s aesthetic choices behind a façade of scientific authority. When the artist says, “I am visualizing bird sounds recorded in a forest,” the viewer is led to believe that the resulting image is a natural and objective representation of those sounds. However, as discussed earlier, the direction of the flow or the choice of color is entirely arbitrary. In a scientific experiment, input A should consistently produce output B, or at least the relationship should be demonstrable. Here, however, input A (bird sound) can be transformed into color C or motion D depending on the artist’s mood that morning. This is not an experiment; it is simply decoration. Phrases like “artificial intelligence is dreaming” or “data sculpture” mystify technical processes. Calling a pixel-generation process based on statistical probabilities “dreaming” is nothing more than presenting a basic mathematical regression as something magical. This causes the work to derive its power not from its own aesthetics, but from the “coolness” of science and technology. If we were to replace the bird sounds with the sound of a vacuum cleaner using the same “mapping” settings, we would still obtain a “mesmerizing” visual. In other words, the beauty of the image does not come from the essence of the data, but entirely from the artist’s graphics engine. In this context, extracting data from bird sounds is not a technical necessity, but rather a storytelling device—a marketing element of the project. Wrapping data in a scientific veneer reinforces the illusion that the work is “meaningful.” But once this illusion dissolves, what remains is merely a high-resolution “screensaver.” Real science uses data to understand reality; this kind of “art,” by contrast, uses data merely as spectacle. Instead of saying, “I shaped this data according to my own will and created something beautiful,” the artist claims: “Through scientific algorithms, I revealed the hidden architecture of the data.” This rhetoric is nothing more than putting on a mask of scientific authority to influence the viewer. This form of pseudo-scientific framing is monetized; data is dramatized, the viewer is drawn into a sense of technological awe, and reality is obscured through spectacle.

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@kikanicolela: OBJKT4OBJKT returns April 7-12 on Tezos, 5 years later
by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝3mofirefly.social
@VECERTRadar
@VECERTRadar

🚨 CRITICAL ALERT: Massive Leak of Identity Documents and KYC Data (Global) 🌍📂 Analyzer has detected one of the largest releases of identity and verification (KYC) documents so far in 2026. The threat actor MONEYLINE has released nearly a Terabyte of sensitive information that compromises the financial and personal security of citizens in over 45 countries, with a massive focus on the United States. 🎭 Threat Actor: MONEYLINE. 📂 Total Volume: Approximately 965 GB of documents. 🗓️ Detection Date: April 3, 2026. 🔹 Passports, Licenses, and SSNs (W-9s). 🔹 Verification selfies and bank statements. 🔹 300 GB of exposed Transak user data. 🌍 Scope: Global (45 countries, including the USA, UK, European Union, Asia, and Africa). 🛠️ Compromised Information (Critical-Level PII) The leak is divided into three main packages of extremely sensitive data: 🇺🇸 USA ID & Bank Package (145 GB): Driver's licenses, passports, and ID cards. Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and W-9 forms. Utility bills and bank statements. 📸 USA Selfie & Doc Package (520 GB): Selfie-style photographs linked to identity documents and SSNs. Additional unspecified documentation for identity verification. 🌐 Global Transak Package (300 GB): Documents and selfies belonging to users of the Transak platform. Affects citizens of 45 countries across multiple continents. Monitor: http://analyzer.vecert.io #Cybersecurity #IdentityTheft #Transak #SSN #DataBreach #KYC #InfoSec #CyberAlert #BreakingNews

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by mishaderidder.eth12653 🥝3mofirefly.social
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